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FACTS, VALUES, JUSTIFICATION, DEMOCRACY 
WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER?  By T. M. Scanlon.  New York, 
N.Y.: Oxford University Press.  Pp. ix, 170.  $25.00. 
Reviewed by Don Herzog∗ 
Equality, you might think, is the more or less universally shared 
value of the modern world, or the West, or anyway these United States.  
“We strive to ensure that the values upon which our country was built, 
including our belief that all people are created equal, are reflected in 
everything our nation does.”  That’s from the 2016 Democratic Party 
platform.1  And look!  “We continue to encourage equality for all citizens 
and access to the American Dream.”  That’s from the 2016 GOP Plat-
form.2  Of course, the parties disagree deeply on the demands of equality.  
If they share an abstract concept, as Ronald Dworkin might put it, they 
have sharply divergent conceptions.3  Or, as someone more skeptical 
might put it, “equality” is just the name of an empty vessel into which 
partisans pour whatever contents they like.  Or, more skeptically yet, 
maybe one of the parties is lying. 
Bad enough, but that underplays the problem.  Unless you’ve been 
held prisoner in a faculty lounge for an awfully long time, you will have 
noticed that equality is not in fact all that widely embraced.  It is, we 
are endlessly instructed, the gauzy mask barely disguising base envy and 
resentment, the repulsive desire of social inferiors to pull down the tal-
ented and accomplished to their own vile level.  Recall Tocqueville’s 
baleful warning against “a debased taste for equality, which leads the 
weak to want to drag the strong to their level.”4  Zip forward a century 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Don Herzog teaches law and political theory at the University of Michigan.  He’s the author, 
most recently, of DEFAMING THE DEAD (2017) and is working on a proposal that we retire the 
concept of sovereignty.  He thanks Liz Anderson, Scott Hershovitz, and the editors of the Harvard 
Law Review, especially Steve Schaus and ImeIme Umana, for comments on an earlier draft. 
 1 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 45 (2016), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/117717.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5S9-9RAZ]. 
 2 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 9 (2016), 
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y6KV-3GT4]. 
 3 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 70–72 (1986). 
 4 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 57 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 
trans., HarperCollins Publishers 2000) (1835).  Tocqueville of course also thinks there’s a “mâle et 
légitime” passion for equality, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN AMÉRIQUE 
86 (Michel Lévy Frères 1864) (1835) — gotta love the gendered imagery — that makes people want 
to be strong and honored.  That putatively hopeful possibility doesn’t do a lot of work in his work 
or conservative thought more generally, or so I’d argue. 
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and some, cross the ocean, jazz up the imagery, but still the underlying 
thesis remains the same.  Here’s Kurt Vonnegut’s chilling portrait of a 
future dystopian America: 
  THE YEAR WAS 2081, and everybody was finally equal.  They 
weren’t only equal before God and the law.  They were equal every which 
way.  Nobody was smarter than anybody else.  Nobody was better looking 
than anybody else.  Nobody was stronger or quicker than anybody else.  All 
this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and 213th Amendments to the 
Constitution, and to the unceasing vigilance of agents of the United States 
Handicapper General.5 
George, who’s bright, has to wear “a little mental handicap radio” that 
assails him with different bursts of noise every twenty seconds, so he 
can’t think better than other people.6  If you’ve got a nice face, you have 
to wear a mask.  You get the idea. 
I’ve never understood why so many conservatives find this picture 
so compelling.  It’s blatantly, hilariously, false.  Egalitarians marveling 
at the wonders of Oxford University did not bomb the medieval build-
ings or try to stop the students from mastering Latin and differential 
calculus.  Instead they worked to build other great universities that 
would accommodate people without blue blood.  Egalitarians struck by 
the gap between the grimy East End of London and the wonders of the 
Lake Country did not trash the rolling hills or try to build tenements 
there.  Instead they fought to extend the railroad so that workers with a 
bit of time off could immerse themselves in natural beauty.  (Wordsworth, 
then a curmudgeonly conservative, harrumphed at what a grotesquely 
bad idea this was: it would despoil the pristine beauty and serene social 
practices of his favored haunts; and lacking fine aesthetic sensibilities, 
the lower orders wouldn’t get anything out of the experience anyway.7)  
The actual history of egalitarian politics is leveling up, not down. 
Still, the critique of equality is longstanding, ardent, seductive, and 
very much ongoing.  Like the idea of equality, it is richly complex and 
diverse.  I don’t want to offer a potted summary or overview of the 
tradition here.  But I do want to invoke one sadly neglected strand, 
because I’ll draw on it later and you might as well let your thoughts 
about it start percolating now.  It’s the thought that social inequality is 
jointly beneficial.  Here’s James Boswell in a 1779 newspaper column: 
  Subordination is in my mind not only necessary for order, but conducive 
to the felicity of society.  I consider society like a grand musical composition, 
in which there must be a wide compass and gradation of notes to produce 
pleasure.  The equality of men, for which some have argued, would be a 
dull monotony, a wearisome repetition of the same notes, varied only by the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 KURT VONNEGUT, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7, 7 (2010). 
 6 Id. 
 7 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Kendal and Windermere Railway (1845), reprinted in 3 THE PROSE 
WORKS OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 337 (W.J.B. Owen & Jane Worthington Smyser eds., 1974). 
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sharps and flats of natural tempers and dispositions.  Whereas in a monar-
chy with all the gradations of nobility, gentry, citizens, in short, all the nu-
merous ranks of society, there is a delightful entertainment, while infinite 
changes of melody and harmony are continually perceived, and where the 
pleasure of hope may be freely indulged in the possibilities of rising to 
wealth, splendour, and honours.  In a republick, men grow selfishly lazy in 
the consciousness of their independency.  Whereas in a monarchy there is a 
reciprocation of active benevolence from the highest to the lowest.  The 
great have the pleasure of humane condescension and respect, their inferiors 
have the pleasure of receiving kindness and exerting gratitude.8 
Startled by that closing thought?  Condescension here isn’t a vice.  
It’s the virtue of a social superior who graciously lowers himself to deal 
with an inferior on apparent or as-if terms of amiable or anyway civil 
equality.  But both parties know perfectly well that it’s a game of pre-
tend, and woe to those underlings who forget it.  It becomes a vice when 
egalitarians undercut the social and conceptual resources that invited 
people to see themselves as superior in the first place.  And that has to 
change the very experience of what it is like to condescend — and to be 
condescended to.  Likewise, insolence and impudence have changed dra-
matically.  Insolence used to be the vice of a social superior who swag-
gered or was rude or abusive in exercising his authority; impudence was 
the vice of the social inferior who mouthed off or was insubordinate.  
They become rough synonyms for rudeness when we lose confidence in 
the everyday grammar of superiority and inferiority.  To realize that we 
can still detect the older usages in action — not that we use the words, 
but that we still do in fact experience and contrast those emotions, 
whether we shrink from them or embrace them — is to realize that we 
still hang on, however furtively, to inequality.9  So political controversies 
about equality cut as deeply as what emotions one can properly experi-
ence and how to understand them. 
T. M. Scanlon’s latest10 contributes to our understanding of equality 
in moral and political theory.  It boasts his signature strengths: with 
great lucidity and patience, he works up elegant distinctions and presses 
them home.  And it systematically defangs some of these time-honored 
indictments of equality.  I learned from it and I liked reading it, too.  
No, that’s not the sort of false geniality reviewers utter before snatching 
their daggers.  But yes, I have some criticisms.  I suspect the last book I 
didn’t want to criticize was one of those journals with (still) blank pages. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 JAMES BOSWELL, 1 THE HYPOCHONDRIACK 245–46 (Margery Bailey ed., 1928) (1779).  
See too, just for instance, Monarchy, or Mob-archy, in NOTES UPON PAINE’S RIGHTS OF MAN 
no. V, 14–15 (1791); SAMUEL PARR, Charity-School Sermon, in 6 THE WORKS OF SAMUEL PARR, 
LL.D. 3, 16 (John Johnstone ed., 1828). 
 9 For more, see DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 206–19 (1998). 
 10 T. M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? (2018). 
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You might think of Scanlon as treating the concept of equality as an 
umbrella or arch, beneath which cluster disparate or at least independ-
ent ideas with some loose family resemblance.  So immediately emerges 
the helpful idea that there are always tradeoffs internal to equality itself 
(to equality themselves, if you’d like an ungrammatical way of under-
lining the point), let alone between equality and liberty or other values.  
Or you might think of him as showing that the same abstract commit-
ment shows up in different domains with different force.  I’m not sure 
what, if anything, hangs on the difference.  Regardless, Scanlon is inter-
ested in humiliating status differences, the rich dominating the poor, 
equality of opportunity, fair economic and political institutions, and the 
equal concern the state must manifest in allocating benefits (pp. 8–9, 
152–54).  Scanlon suggests — it is just one of many illuminating distinc-
tions motoring the book — that it is one thing to object that some are 
badly off.  So, for instance, it is distressing to learn that in some places 
life expectancy is low or that some are so poor that they can’t afford a 
minimally decent way of life.  That’s not yet a worry about equality.  
Knowing that others live on to wrinkled venerability, or that they spend 
thousands on gleaming home espresso machines, might only remind us 
that those worse off could in fact be better off.  Then, what seems like 
an appeal to equality has epistemic force alone.  But it instantly becomes 
a worry about equality if you imagine unjust institutions, say, in the 
economic case, governments administering the legal regimes of job mar-
kets, foreign trade, taxation, and so on, but administering them with 
contemptuous disregard for the interests of the worse off.  Now the com-
plaint isn’t just that the poor have low welfare.  It’s that the difference 
between their low welfare and others’ prosperity is unfair, so something 
could and should be done about it.  Scanlon says that his view isn’t 
necessarily limited to the nation-state (p. 9).  Sometimes — it’s an open 
question — there are institutions of the right sort that have international 
or even global scope.  But here it takes such institutions to give the 
concept of equality a grip, or so Scanlon thinks. 
Sometimes, I’m inclined to add, it’s enough that there could and 
should be such institutions, at least if the reason there aren’t is that the 
better off squelch their development lest those institutions redistribute 
their goodies.  I don’t doubt that current institutional arrangements 
make a normative difference.  So do all kinds of other facts.  But I do 
doubt that we are normative captives to whatever those arrangements 
happen now to be.  Scanlon recognizes that possibility.  The argument, 
he says, would proceed in two steps: first, that there needs to be such an 
institution; second, that if there were one, we would properly see an 
objectionable inequality (pp. 24–25).  “[E]ven if this is correct,” he adds, 
“it would remain the case, I believe, that under present circumstances 
what is objectionable about international disparities in life expectancy 
is not the inequality involved” (p. 25).  The thought is that we need an 
actual institution, not a hypothetical one, to invoke inequality.  It’s not 
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even enough if we have good reason to build such an institution.  That 
reason might of course be overridden.  To take a hoary concern, we 
might fret that a world government would be tyrannical or would gut 
the possibilities of meaningful democratic participation in the nation-
state.  (Insert here a snatch of the Brussels and Brexit Blues, not partic-
ularly melodious and in a minor key.)  But Scanlon’s view is that even 
if our all-things-considered best course of action is to build such an in-
stitution, until and unless it’s around we don’t have an inequality. 
What divides Scanlon from his imagined interlocutor (let’s call him 
“Herzog”) here?  Apparently just a linguistic point: whether we should 
now use the term inequality.  Elsewhere in the book, though, the current 
facts have actual practical bite.  They dictate what we should do, not 
merely how we should talk.  Scanlon argues that affirmative action for 
women and minorities at, say, medical schools might be perfectly com-
patible with his conception of equality of opportunity (pp. 48–49).  It 
doesn’t stigmatize anyone, he thinks, to give a boost in the admissions 
processes to minorities and women, if, say, they will practice in currently 
underserved communities, or if their emergence as doctors will help de-
molish the belief that only white men are truly able — and if these are 
proper goals for medical schools to pursue.  In this way, and as a general 
matter, Scanlon thinks, our notions of desert are “institution-dependent” 
(p. 57).11  Everything hangs not just on what meritorious traits an indi-
vidual might possess, but what makes them meritorious: the way they 
equip the individual to perform a task or fulfill a role well (p. 57).  (The 
central thrust of current constitutional law, by contrast, does not allow 
a public institution to depart from race-blind treatment solely in order 
to help overcome “societal” discrimination.12  It would be facile to think 
that Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence ought simply to track our 
best understanding of equality: what the Constitution dictates and what 
courts can enforce can’t conceivably exhaust the demands of equality.  
As if legislatures have nothing to do; as if some pressing demands of 
equality, like how we treat each other in everyday settings, weren’t 
largely beyond the state’s ken.  It would also be facile to imagine one 
has nothing to do with the other.)  Given the work these institutions are 
properly doing, it makes sense for admissions officers to pay attention 
to such traits.  Though Scanlon doesn’t put it this way, we might say 
that if one goal of a medical school is to train doctors who will be role 
models for minorities, paying attention to a candidate’s minority status 
isn’t some regrettable departure from merit, to be justified, if at all, as 
the unpleasant price of trying to move toward justice or equality.  It is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 Cf. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 44–46 (1998) (arguing that notions 
of desire are similarly constructed by aggregating disparate reasons for action). 
 12 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  Croson is the most sustained and important treatment of the point 
here.  See 488 U.S. at 498–506. 
  
2364 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:2359 
a kind of merit: it is a trait that helps get the institution’s work done.  
Then too we might say, though Scanlon also doesn’t put it this way, that 
in such circumstances affirmative action isn’t merely permitted.  It’s 
required.  Why should an institution be free to ignore factors in the ad-
mission process that help it pursue its proper goals? 
And now the crucial bit, crucial anyway for my purposes here.  
Thinking about conquering discriminatory attitudes by showing that 
women and minorities perform well, Scanlon writes: 
  This rationale for affirmative action depends on the empirical claim that 
such a policy of preference will have the intended effect of undermining 
discriminatory attitudes (rather than just triggering resentment, or leading 
its intended beneficiaries to be seen as unqualified because they have been 
given this preference).  It also justifies a policy of affirmative action only as 
a transitional measure.  After a period of time it will either have had its 
intended effects, and will thus no longer be needed, or have been shown not 
to do so, in which case it cannot be justified in this way.  (p. 49) 
I want to focus on the way contingent facts work here.  “After a 
period of time” doesn’t bite the bullet that Justice O’Connor did for the 
Court: “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”13  
(Tick, tick: that was 15 years ago.  Yes, litigators will pounce to treat 
that expectation as a holding.  I bet some judges — and Justices — will, 
too, even if that 25-year line seems yanked from judicial thin air — not 
the sort of thing conservatives claim to like in their constitutional law.)  
But the instinct is the same.  If the policy is supposed to be justified by 
its consequences, either you realize them, so you don’t need the policy 
any more, or you never do, which makes the policy seem causally inef-
ficacious.  Either way, at some point you have to scrap it. 
One could quibble over whether that pair exhausts the alternatives.  
But instead look at the prior empirical claim.  Maybe we’ll learn that 
the policy doesn’t work because no matter how good black doctors are, 
affirmative action redoubles (some or enough) whites’ conviction that 
blacks are less qualified.  (“Oh,” they silently groan — or smirk — when 
an African American doctor walks into their office for their appoint-
ment.  “I know how you got here.  I wonder if I can still get a real 
doctor.”)  We could construct fanciful scenarios about how that might 
happen, but let’s stick with the depressingly obvious one: it’s because 
whites’ racism is more or less evidence-proof.  I’ll turn up the stylistic 
volume, though not I think to hysterical levels: Scanlon is implying that 
the justifiability of affirmative action is held hostage by white racism.  
If that racism is obdurate enough, we ought not pursue affirmative ac-
tion, at least as far as the proffered rationale goes. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).  As a member of the committee that drafted the 
admissions policy challenged in that suit, I was deposed by Grutter’s lawyer.  Good times.  
   
2018] FACTS, VALUES, JUSTIFICATION, DEMOCRACY 2365 
If you’re a certain kind of consequentialist, you won’t see anything 
worrisome here.  We have to take the facts as they are, you’ll think.  And 
we could dress up that view in more sophisticated and plausible garb.14  
For that matter, if you’re a certain kind of Kantian, you will have an 
easy time adopting a different but equally simple view: what’s decisive 
is the counterfactual world in which your maxim is universalized, so 
that everyone (similarly situated) acts as you propose.  Or we could shift 
the idiom.  Politics, we might agree, is the art of the possible.  It is not 
an arena for utopian dreams; it is the awkward business of stumbling 
around and trying to make the world just a bit better, or just a bit less 
awful.  We must act on the basis of people as they are, not as we might 
like them to be. 
Still I want to suggest there is something to worry about here, a 
worry that neither textbook consequentialism nor textbook Kantianism 
illuminates all that well.  What’s undercutting the efficacy of affirmative 
action is that some hold an unreasonable belief, to put it softly — or, 
aloud — a belief that’s not just indefensibly stupid but also outrageously 
unjust, indeed, itself part of the problem we’re trying to solve.  It’s as 
though racism becomes not just self-perpetuating but self-justifying. 
It’s not that the facts never matter.  Of course they do, often unex-
ceptionably so.  (I’ve long thought, and even said, and sometimes writ-
ten! that political theorists are people who want to mock their colleagues 
in political science as barefoot positivists who believe in some scarecrow 
version of a fact/value distinction, but themselves want to disdain facts 
on the ground that their work is normative.  Surely something here has 
to give.)  But when we’re pursuing equality, we often run roughshod 
over perfectly sincere anti-egalitarian commitments.  Antidiscrimination 
law does not permit an employer to defend racially discriminatory hiring 
policies by pleading that she’s merely giving the customers what they 
want.15  You might think that’s a prophylactic rule: we want to prevent 
the racist employer from hiding behind an apparently benign pretext.  
But the law doesn’t finally care about the motives of the employer.  And 
the law is cheerful about overriding bromides about consumer sover-
eignty, or taking preferences as they come, or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 
or anything of that sort.  Does the defensibility of this legal regime hang 
on the claim that it will rid the market of racist preferences, whether 
those of employers, employees, or consumers?  Well, surely it hasn’t ac-
complished that.  I’m sometimes inclined even to doubt it’s made much 
of a dent.  But that dour skepticism doesn’t begin to undercut my com-
mitment to the project of antidiscrimination law.  And I don’t think that 
makes me a fanatic, as say a would-be prudent consequentialist might 
suggest. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 Consider the treatment of excluding gays from the military — you can decide how sophisti-
cated and plausible it is — in RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 314–23 (1992). 
 15 See especially Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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You might approach this question as a matter of equality of oppor-
tunity.  So, you could try to shrug off the worry about the consequences 
of antidiscrimination law: it’s enough, as a matter of equality, that it 
gives individual job candidates a fair shake.  That sounds reassuring, 
but it doesn’t squarely meet the worry I’m gnawing away at — and I 
doubt it’s a move available to Scanlon.  Remember that Scanlon holds 
that affirmative action isn’t at odds with equality of opportunity — not, 
that is, where the relevant traits we are focusing on are relevant to the 
goals the institution serves.  It won’t do to say that affirmative action 
depends on the consequences, but antidiscrimination is just constitutive 
of what equality of opportunity is.  Given Scanlon’s commitments, that 
looks like an optical illusion.  Suppose for instance we learn that mem-
bers of some racial group — call them Xs — don’t do as well as their 
individual applications might otherwise suggest.  If they systematically 
underperform, they won’t be as deserving as they otherwise look.  So 
the institution will justifiably pursue its goals by giving them short 
shrift.  It isn’t acting on the basis of irrational stigma; it is according Xs 
equal concern.  Likewise for boosting the credentials of Ys once we learn 
they systematically overperform.  And that goes whether we’re consid-
ering the relation between admissions credentials and performance 
within the institution, or admissions credentials and performance later, 
in the roles the institution prepares people for. 
Now consider Scanlon’s position on what he calls substantive equal-
ity of opportunity (pp. 53–73).  He is worried — so am I16 — about glib 
appeals to what individuals choose.  In the debates over equal pay for 
equal work, about which I cheerfully refuse to provide a footnote for 
the insatiable editors of the Law Review, people sometimes shrug and 
say, “As long as firms aren’t discriminating in the hiring process, it’s 
neither here nor there if women choose to pursue lower-paying careers: 
if they’d rather be nurses than doctors, secretaries than bosses, grade-
school teachers than college professors.”  Not so fast, urges Scanlon.  We 
want to be able to put pressure on how and why individuals came to 
see themselves as actually having certain choices, or to see those choices 
as potentially valuable for people like themselves.  If you’re a girl grow-
ing up in a culture saturated with misogyny, just for instance — or, um, 
not exactly just for instance — you may well come to think that women 
shouldn’t be doctors, or you wouldn’t be any good at it anyway, or it 
would get in the way of having a family, where that last depends on not 
even beginning to think critically about the current constellation of gen-
der scripts and job markets.  Or as Scanlon puts it: 
The value of having a choice is undermined when one is uninformed about 
the nature of the alternatives, or when conditions make it unlikely that one 
will consider certain valuable alternatives or take them seriously.  So one 
thing that individuals have strong reason to want is to have what happens to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 215–47 (1989). 
   
2018] FACTS, VALUES, JUSTIFICATION, DEMOCRACY 2367 
them depend on how they react when given the choice under sufficiently good 
conditions for making such choices.  This is particularly true in the case of 
important features of their lives, such as what careers they will pursue.  (p. 62) 
And again, “the requirements of substantive opportunity are not satis-
fied if young women fail to strive for positions for which they would be 
qualified because their families believe, and encourage them to believe, 
that these careers are not appropriate for women” (p. 64).  But suppose 
such a young woman says, “Look, maybe I’d be better off, more auton-
omous, with the upbringing you’d have given me.  But like it or not I 
am now the person I am, and I am in no position to rework my identity 
so fundamentally.  Don’t tell me my choices don’t count.  Don’t even 
tell me they aren’t fully sufficient.  They’re all I can plausibly make and 
I refuse to be overridden by my counterfactual self, or imagine that that 
self has more dignity, more standing to assert herself, than I do.”  I’m 
unsure what would count as a persuasive response. 
Let’s step back and contrast the way Scanlon handles facts in these 
three examples.  One: suppose there are no institutions that could handle 
issues raised by global variations in life expectancy, but there could be.  
That gives us good reason to work toward such institutions, but it 
doesn’t change the fact that even sharp differences in life expectancy 
don’t now properly qualify as inequality.  Two: suppose increasing the 
pipeline of women or minority doctors would not in fact help serve un-
derserved communities or help undercut stigma and prejudice about the 
abilities of women and minorities.  Then we ought not increase the pipe-
line, period.  Three: suppose women don’t try to become CEOs because 
society or their families have drummed sexist idiocies into their heads.  
Then their choices on the job market don’t reflect substantive equality 
of opportunity, even if all hiring decisions are fair.  Depending on which 
example you choose, the current facts of the matter are either conceptu-
ally decisive for the applicability of equality talk, or actually decisive for 
what we should do, or shunted aside for counterfactuals with practical 
force. 
I have no interest in quibbling with Scanlon’s examples.  And I do 
not contrast them to suggest that his position on the role of facts in 
normative argument is incoherent or even unconsidered.  I don’t myself 
see any interesting differences between the role of the current facts in 
affirmative action and in substantive equality of opportunity, but I’m 
open to argument.  The point I want to press is rather this: I doubt there 
is a simple blanket rule for how social facts and counterfactuals properly 
work in normative argument.  I have up my sleeve nothing like an ar-
chitectonic theory, carving up the domain and explaining why different 
sorts of issues properly feature different treatments.  The problems here 
are real.  They are large, amorphous too, and I suspect the best we can 
do, at least for now, is to muck along by delving deeper into particular 
issues and trying to make reflective sense, shuttling in the now familiar 
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way between tentative principles and concrete applications, of how we 
argue and how we believe we should argue. 
Here’s one punchline: uncertainty about how the facts should matter 
generates a distinct kind of normative uncertainty.  (Try scrambling 
those three normative issues and the way Scanlon deploys the facts in 
each.  See how much changes?)  One reason our normative convictions 
are insecure, that is, is that we don’t know quite how to use the facts 
and counterfactuals at hand.  This would remain true even if we some-
how commanded rock-solid agreement on what facts and counterfactu-
als actually obtain, agreement too on our normative principles; the point 
I am pressing here is then very much in the spirit of Rawls’s burdens of 
judgment, if not the same as anything on his list.17  It means too that 
critics always have another powerful if indirect way of criticizing our 
arguments.  They can assail not whatever normative principles we state, 
but how we happen to enlist the facts.  Even those of us committed to 
the concept of equality — even those of us who share particular concep-
tions of what it entails — are likely to go on debating what is to be done 
in various settings, just because of these multiple ways of enlisting the 
facts.  And you thought normativity itself was the mysterious problem. 
* * * 
Time to return to Boswell’s paean to inequality.  If or insofar as he’s 
imagining a world where the fact of birth dictates your social status, 
there’s an obvious affront to equality of opportunity.  (Assignment for 
the reader: identify what’s wrong with the suggestion that whether 
you’re born a prince or a pauper is random, that everyone has the same 
chance of occupying any position, so inherited status is perfectly egali-
tarian.  No, sorry, the answer is not that there are more paupers.)  And 
surely monarchy works that way.  But Boswell is explicitly imagining 
people happily contemplating “rising to wealth, splendour, and hon-
ours.”  Let’s suppose that that competition is genuinely open.  (No, it 
wasn’t all that open in Boswell’s England.  But how open is it in today’s 
United States?  Any viable conception of equality of opportunity is going 
to have to say something about equality of starting points, and when it 
comes to public education, we are risibly far from meeting that stan 
dard.18)  Do the “inferiors” have a complaint?  Boswell wants us to see 
them as not stigmatized.  There is nothing, he thinks, contemptible 
about them, and nothing contemptuous in their treatment by “the great.”  
This sentiment was in fact readily underwritten by Christianity, with 
assiduous reminders to the superiors that all were equal in God’s eyes, 
along with Jesus’s declaration that “it is easier for a camel to go through 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 55–57 (expanded ed. 2005). 
 18 Here, I’m essentially agreeing with Scanlon (see pp. 65, 71–72, 89, 116). 
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the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of 
God.”19  Let’s eavesdrop on Queen Charlotte sternly instructing her 
loathsome son, the Prince of Wales and future George IV, on his eight-
eenth birthday: 
Be charitable to everybody, not forgetting your meaner servants.  Don’t use 
them with indifference, rather pity them that are obliged to serve, and do 
unto them as you would be done by.  I mean by that you should not think 
yourself above doing good to them.  The contrary will make you appear 
vain, and vanity is the root of all vice and a sure proof of ignorance.  For 
what is man to man?  We are all equal and become only of consequence by 
setting good examples to others, and these must be given with a view of 
doing our duty but not with the idea of superiority, for then the action loses 
its merits.20 
I would assure you, after endless absorption in the relevant sources, 
that it’s way too easy to dismiss Boswell’s sketch out of hand as thread-
bare ideology.  Some of “the great” really cared for the “inferiors,” and 
condescended not just to talk to them but to offer aid.  Some of the 
“inferiors” really did bask in the pleasures of gratitude.  Some, not all: I 
wouldn’t enlist his sketch as terrific social history, either.  Regardless, 
those grumbling and agitating for change were often dismissed, not just 
from Parliament and the pulpit but also by their neighbors, as malcon-
tent and — you guessed it — envious and resentful. 
If you think the scheme is still hopelessly and outrageously unequal, 
why?  Is it that the rich have “unacceptable forms of power over” the 
poor (p. 8)?  (Social status is different from income and wealth, but I set 
that aside.)  Or that the scheme undercuts “the fairness of political insti-
tutions” (p. 8)?  Well, yes: theirs was a world in which — if male workers 
had the franchise; franchise requirements varied widely around England; 
and don’t imagine women were voting, because precious few contempo-
raries even glimpsed the possibility — voting was public, so their land-
lords knew how they voted, and reprisals were at the ready.21  Though 
I’ve barely mentioned these strands of his argument, Scanlon can read-
ily explain what’s wrong in these ways. 
But shift the setting.  An anthropologist from some hazily Scandinavian 
paradise of your most fervent egalitarian dreams (or nightmares) joins 
you in strolling through an American factory.  “Who are those people?” 
she asks, pointing at some overweight men, mostly white and some in 
suits, walking around but not obviously doing anything productive.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Matthew 19:24. 
 20 Letter from Queen Charlotte to the Prince of Wales (Aug. 12, 1770), in 1 THE CORRESPON-
DENCE OF GEORGE, PRINCE OF WALES 1770–1812, at 5, 5–6 (A. Aspinall ed., 1963).  Her last 
thought is intriguingly close to Kant’s position on moral worth. 
 21 Indispensable here is E. Anthony Smith, Earl Fitzwilliam and Malton: A Proprietary Borough 
in the Early Nineteenth Century, 80 ENG. HIST. REV. 51 (1965). 
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“Foremen and managers,” you say.  You’re alarmed: Does she not know 
this already?  Does her country not have such characters?  And she looks 
quizzical: “And they get to tell the workers what to do? and when to do 
it? and how to do it? and discipline them for even trivial infractions?”  
“Sure,” you say.  Given today’s English locutions, you’re not likely to 
rhapsodize over the “grand musical composition” and “delightful enter-
tainment” presented by the factory hierarchy.22  But you are likely to 
think that the setup is jointly beneficial, that it is not nutty to hope that 
managers and foremen will take pleasure in treating the workers well 
and that the workers will take pleasure in being so treated.  (You needn’t 
think that pleasure or desirable consciousness or preference satisfaction 
is the only game in town to think both that it matters on its own and 
that it is often evidence that other and more important values are being 
realized.  If you take pleasure in being treated with respect, for instance, 
that’s in part because you know what is true: that it is a good thing to 
be treated with respect.)  So how different is your view from Boswell’s?  
No one is born a foreman or a manager — though we should worry 
about nepotism and inheritance — and let’s set aside worries about 
whether hiring practices are genuinely open, or people have been put in 
positions where their education and socialization gives them a valuable 
range of choices they can genuinely consider as open to them. 
The anthropologist is still baffled.  “Why do the foremen get to tell 
the workers what to do?”  Stymied temporarily, you happily recall  
Engels’s trenchant rejoinder to the anarchist thought that we could dis-
pense with authority.  You can’t run a factory without some hierarchy, 
you say.23  “That’s probably right,” she says.  “But think about how the 
foremen and managers came to exercise authority.  They just signed 
contracts with the company.  And the workers came to be subject to 
authority by signing contracts, too.  But the foremen and managers 
never even contracted with the workers.  The foremen and managers 
have no duty to be responsive to the workers.  You can say they all 
consented, though before I agreed I’d want to know whether they had 
reasonable alternatives.  But I don’t care if they consented.  Even if 
there has to be authority here, shouldn’t it be exercised democratically?  
Shouldn’t the managers have to be responsive, at least in large part, not 
just to the company or its stockholders, but also to the workers they 
supervise?  Remember company towns?  Workers signed a contract per-
mitting the company to run not just the workplace but also the town 
they lived in.  And surely that’s unacceptable.  If you can’t hire a mayor 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 245–46. 
 23 Friedrich Engels, On Authority, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 730, 730–33 (Robert C. 
Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
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and get people to sign contracts consenting to his rule, why can you hire 
a foreman and get people to sign contracts consenting to his rule?”24 
I’ve said nothing about the size of the managers’ and workers’ 
paychecks or bank balances.  I confess that even though I care a lot 
about equality, Gini coefficients put me to sleep, and not because I have 
any difficulties with statistics.  They might be evidence of something 
that ought to concern us: say that the political process has been captured 
by actors who deal themselves unjustifiable regulatory and tax benefits.  
But standing alone?  Zzzzzzzz.  Yet when Scanlon writes about eco-
nomic inequality, he mostly thinks about income.  He declares that it’s 
“troubling” that in today’s America, some earn vast multiples of what 
others do (pp. 134, 150).25  And then he backs up and tries to figure out 
whether there is good reason to structure markets and especially the 
regime of taxation to enable such inequalities of income (pp. 133–51).  
But he doesn’t think about the content of the relationship between the 
manager and the worker.  Yes, factories aren’t nearly as prominent fix-
tures in the American workplace as they used to be.  I’m all in favor of 
being sociologically concrete, so I’d want to think too about the lives of 
those sometimes labeled the precariat; and those “contractors” who drive 
for Uber and Lyft; and temporary workers who bounce around from 
workplace to workplace, in part because firms find it useful to avoid 
paying benefits; and so on.  In all these cases, there’s way more at stake 
for equality than the size of a paycheck or a bank balance.  There’s 
always a question of how supervision, management — government — 
works, and whether we should see it as legitimate.  And one plausible 
intuition about equality is that even if all the workplace roles are genu-
inely open in a fair competition, and even if every individual voluntarily 
chooses the job she takes, there is something objectionably unequal in 
the terms of life on the job.  Workers, one might well think, should be 
citizens, not subjects: actors entitled to engage in self-government, not 
the passive recipients of rule from above. 
There’s lots to say about this, but I want to use the scenario first to 
touch again on the difficulties of how we use facts in normative argu-
ments, second to turn to some worries about Scanlon’s contractualism. 
Surely there is an institution that could change the rules of the work-
place: American government.  (If you’re worried that somehow states 
would run into dormant commerce clause objections, have Congress do 
it as regulation of commerce.)  So we’re not in the position Scanlon 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Consider ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE 
OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE 291–303 (1983).  For government as not just the institution of the state, but also an activity 
stretching across the social landscape, see DON HERZOG, HOUSEHOLD POLITICS 123–25 (2013). 
 25 Scanlon says that his view, like Professor Elizabeth Anderson’s, is “relational” (p. 9 n.10).  See 
Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287 (1999).  But either he has 
a very different understanding of relationality or he’s thinking of an entirely different set of relations. 
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thinks we are in pondering life expectancy around the globe.  Still noth-
ing now stops workers and companies from contracting on democratic 
terms, and apparently they choose not to.  How much deference is that 
fact entitled to?  We could investigate the socialization that might make 
workers — and bosses! — think it simply out of bounds or inappropriate 
for people like them: remember that we have to meet some background 
conditions for choice to be valuable or to have legitimating force.  Here 
our egalitarian will point an accusing finger at Americans’ longstanding 
ideological anathema against socialism.  She will suggest that we could 
at least distinguish state socialism, with a centralized authority dictating 
prices across the board, from market socialism, where prices float freely 
but we’ve changed governance relations in the firm.26  And — recall the 
complaint of the woman whose occupational choices are indicted as re-
flecting poor socialization — here Americans may object that “maybe 
we’d be better off had we not been ideologically conditioned in that way.  
But we are who we are, and we can’t turn our backs on our traditions, 
our identities, now.” 
But now consider a much broader range of facts: how a differenti-
ated society is arranged.  State, church, market, family, university, sports 
team, private club, and so much more: that’s the top-down view.  (For 
the bottom-up view, think about the various roles an individual moves 
in and out of.)  Our social landscape is nothing like a unified hierarchy 
or one of Goffman’s total institutions.27  It’s a ramshackle collection of 
largely autonomous institutions with messy but real jurisdictional divi-
sions.  Any institution ought to be selectively blind and pay attention 
only to contextually relevant facts.  That immediately gives equality a 
social-structural form.  That’s the force of the iconic representation of 
justice as blindfolded, and the source then of painfully obvious indict-
ments of our criminal justice system for paying attention to race and 
wealth.  To be equal under law is just to have the law ignore such irrel-
evant facts.  (The same exact thought is at the center of modern thinking 
about freedom, which provides a useful corrective when people summon 
up some apocalyptic conflict between freedom and equality.  Recall 
Locke: “the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, 
indifferent, and the same to all Parties.”28)  Or again, it’s weird if you 
get a better grade in your philosophy course because your professor 
shares your religious faith, or a worse grade if he doesn’t: he has to treat 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 On the epistemic failures of the former, the canonical text remains F. A. Hayek, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).  COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING 
(F. A. Hayek ed., 1935) and OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY 
OF SOCIALISM (Benjamin E. Lippincott ed., 1938) remain of more than purely historical interest. 
 27 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961), especially chapter 1. 
 28 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 324 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
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his students as equals, which here means in part simply ignoring what-
ever religious commitments they have.  There’s an important sense in 
which that’s true even in a theology course. 
Plenty of theorists have asked the question, By virtue of what feature 
of persons are we equal?  The usual candidates include rational agency, 
the ability to frame and pursue a conception of the good, creation by 
God, and so on.  Never forget Hobbes’s sinister and amusing suggestion 
that we’re equal in part because anyone can kill anyone else,29 or, as 
Shakespeare’s Nym puts it, “Men / may sleep, and they may have their 
throats about / them at that time, and some say knives have edges”;30 
and in part because everyone is vain enough to prefer his own wisdom 
to others’, and “there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distri-
bution of anything than that every man is contented with his share.”31  
But here the right question is, By virtue of what feature of society are 
we equal?  And the answer is social differentiation. 
Social differentiation also enables us to pursue a range of different 
values: salvation in church, wealth on the market, athletic excellence on 
a sports team, and so on.  And surely we do not now arrange every one 
of these institutions in democratic ways.  It is incongruous, in some cases 
pernicious, to imagine doing so.  Must egalitarians reject Catholicism 
and embrace Congregationalism?  Must they insist that students decide, 
or even help decide, on course syllabi and requirements for the major?  
And so on.  Even if you think equality requires democratic governance 
across the social landscape, you need to remember that we sensibly 
might trade off equality against other values. 
Armed with this broader factual picture, you return to our lefty an-
thropologist and ask, “Why should the workplace be democratic?  
You’re just threatening us with another kind of monotony, if not the one 
Boswell had in mind.  I prefer the diversity of values we can achieve 
when we don’t democratize everything in sight.”  I don’t propose to 
settle this dispute in a review essay (or anywhere else); I don’t see any 
point in tipping my hand on what my own druthers or even considered 
judgments are.  Here I want only to underline again one kind of diffi-
culty that the debate will inevitably spawn: not just what the facts of 
the matter are, but which facts are relevant or decisive as they stand, 
which should be undercut by critique, which should be shunted aside in 
the name of counterfactuals, and so on. 
But I mostly want to use this scenario to dig in and explore two 
worries about Scanlon’s contractualism.  That view, which he’s been 
developing for some time now, says at its core that “when we address 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 74–75 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994) (1651).  
 30 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 2, sc. 1, ll. 20–22 (David Bevington ed., Bantam 
Books 1988) (1623).  
 31 HOBBES, supra note 29, at 75.  
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our minds to a question of right and wrong, what we are trying to decide 
is, first and foremost, whether certain principles are ones that no one, if 
suitably motivated, could reasonably reject.”32  There’s a lot to unpack 
here: Scanlon of course has spent many thoughtful pages unpacking it 
himself.  We could put pressure on the role of principles, or suitable 
motivation, or reasonableness, or the centrality of rejection.  (That we 
could put pressure on any of these is compatible with acknowledging 
that of course they hook up with each other.)  But here I want mostly to 
put pressure on reasonableness. 
Reasonableness isn’t the same as rationality, especially if we take the 
latter in the formidable instrumental sense of economists and decision 
theorists, with constrained maximization, quasi-concave utility func-
tions, expected utility as a way of collapsing possible outcomes with dif-
ferent probabilities into one value, and so on.  Rawls’s strategy was to 
characterize the original position so that the instrumentally rational 
choices of parties behind the veil of ignorance would be reasonable.33  
One worry is that the original position is an amplifying device: tiny ad-
justments in how we characterize it (or, to be more terminologically ac-
curate, other ways of characterizing the initial situation, Rawls’s name 
for any such hypothetical contract setup34) could lead to huge swings in 
the principles of justice selected.  If that’s right, it undercuts the justifi-
catory force of seeing the principles emerge from such a procedure, un-
less you have a lot of confidence in the precise features of the original 
position. 
Scanlon’s approach, by contrast, is to appeal head-on to reasonable-
ness, and to imagine us, here, now, not hypothetical agents behind a veil 
of ignorance, proposing principles and making objections.  So Scanlon 
is emphatically not imagining a world of strategic bargaining, with the 
economist’s usual if covert background principle of justice, “to each ac-
cording to his threat advantage.”  It might be good for you if we adopted 
the principle, “everyone should do whatever you want, whenever you 
ask.”  But it is obviously reasonable for others to reject that view: it is a 
severe incursion on their autonomy and serves no purpose that would 
make sense to others.  Similarly, you can’t reasonably reject a proposed 
principle just because you think it might be bad for you: to cost you 
money, say.  It might be rational, in the narrow self-interested sense, to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 SCANLON, supra note 11, at 189.  Scanlon repeatedly invokes the view (see pp. 105–06, 113, 116).  
See also, e.g., T. M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT REASONS 96 (2014) [hereinafter BEING 
REALISTIC] (“If it would be reasonable to reject any principle that would permit a certain action, then 
that action would be morally wrong.”).  T. M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS 89–105 (2008), help-
fully compares and contrasts his views to facets of Kant’s.  For Scanlon’s recent thoughts on how he 
might now recast the view, see T. M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Justification (2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) [hereinafter Justification], http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/ 
Scanlon%20Contractualism%20and%20Justification.pdf [https://perma.cc/J56N-G7VX]. 
 33 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 17, at 52–53 (providing an especially concise explanation of the 
issue). 
 34 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–16, 105 (rev. ed. 1999). 
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fight the adoption of such a principle.  But unless there’s more to say — 
for instance, that people like you are asked to pay too often or too 
much — it wouldn’t be reasonable. 
That’s the core of the view, enough for my purposes to generate two 
connected worries.  One: what, if anything, remains of the individual 
point of view in proposing principles and considering objections?  Two: 
what if there are no reasonable objections to competing principles, or 
reasonable objections to all principles? 
On the first, consider again the contrast with Rawls.  Rawls writes 
about multiple parties behind the veil of ignorance, but of course they’re 
all identical, endowed with the same knowledge, the same lack of 
knowledge, the same motivations.  So “multiple” isn’t doing any work 
and “contract” is a misleading category.  We might as well think of the 
original position as modeling an individual choice.  Because Scanlon is 
thinking about us, here, now, he has plenty of room to explore what 
individual differences will be salient. 
But on this matter, to the best of my knowledge anyway, Scanlon is 
surprisingly brief.  Here’s the core claim: 
[A]n assessment of the rejectability of a principle must take into account the 
consequences of its acceptance in general, not merely in a particular case 
that we may be concerned with.  Since we cannot know, when we are making 
this assessment, which particular individuals will be affected by it in which 
ways (who will be affected as an agent required to act a certain way, who 
as a potential victim, who as a bystander, and so on), our assessment cannot 
be based on the particular aims, preferences, and other characteristics of 
specific individuals.  We must rely instead on commonly available infor-
mation about what people have reason to want.  I will refer to this as infor-
mation about generic reasons. 
  Some examples: We commonly take it that people have strong reasons 
to want to avoid bodily injury, to be able to rely on assurances they are 
given, and to have control over what happens to their own bodies.35 
The move to such generic reasons makes it seem plausible that any-
one can work out the relevant reasons by herself, just sitting and thinking 
it through, and that she can do so even for those very differently situated.  
Scanlon readily offers, for instance, that “[s]everely disabled humans 
have reason to want those things that any human has reason to want, 
insofar as these are things that they are capable of benefiting from.  
These will include, at least, protection and care, affection, and those 
enjoyments of which the person is capable.”36  And Scanlon works up 
elaborate arguments to defend surprisingly intricate principles.  Here’s 
one: 
Principle F: If (1) A voluntarily and intentionally leads B to expect that A 
will do X (unless B consents to A’s not doing so); (2) A knows that B wants 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 SCANLON, supra note 11, at 204. 
 36 Id. at 186. 
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to be assured of this; (3) A acts with the aim of providing this assurance, 
and has good reason to believe that he or she has done so; (4) B knows that 
A has the beliefs and intentions just described; (5) A intends for B to know 
this, and knows that B does know it; and (6) B knows that A has this 
knowledge and intent; then, in the absence of special justification, A must 
do X unless B consents to X’s not being done.37 
The picture of anyone working up a view on her own might be rein-
forced.  “In order to decide whether a principle could reasonably be 
rejected,” Scanlon tells us, “we need to consider it from a number of 
standpoints”38: beneficiaries of it, those constrained by it, people who’d 
fare better under some other principle, and the like.  But any suitably 
motivated individual trying to propose a principle that can’t reasonably 
be rejected already has to think through all those standpoints.  (I wonder 
whether “suitable motivation” adds anything at all to reasonableness 
and rejectability, but leave that aside for now.  Parsimony is the least of 
my worries about this theory.)  This is just another way of underlining 
the importance of the fact that we are not playing “to each according to 
his threat advantage.”  You’re not behind a veil of ignorance; you may 
know perfectly well that some principle you’re considering would be 
wonderfully good or horribly bad for you; but unless those facts turn 
out to be the appropriate sorts of considerations for you to venture and 
others to think through, they’re neither here nor there.  In this way, 
actual individuals in actual social positions seem to be vanishing from 
the argument, or, better perhaps, turning into hazy cartoon versions of 
themselves.39 
Still, it would lampoon Scanlon’s project to suggest he thinks he can 
singlehandedly spin out a set of principles that no one could reasonably 
reject.  He notes for instance that what we think about generic reasons 
“is subject to modification under the pressures of moral thought and 
argument.”40  And surely that means actual argument in the actual 
world, not just further chatting silently to oneself.  So not just intricate 
Principle F, but any and all of Scanlon’s suggestions for principles no 
one can reasonably reject are up for grabs in moral argument.  We 
should take them as candidates: plausible, well-considered for sure, but 
ineluctably one person’s point of view on these matters.  So the turn to 
generic reasons doesn’t mean we can trust Scanlon, or anyone else, to 
think hard and reveal the right set of principles.  If you don’t think 
generic reasons might be hard to grasp, ask yourself what you think of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Id. at 304. 
 38 Id. at 213.  
 39 I am reminded of an oddity in Professor John Harsanyi’s utilitarianism.  He writes, “The 
social welfare function W of individual j must be of the following mathematical form . . . .”  JOHN 
C. HARSANYI, ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 81 
(1976).  But j appears nowhere on the right-hand side of the equation; k and l and . . . have the 
identical function.  So it doesn’t matter who the individual is; in invoking an “individual social 
welfare function,” Harsanyi adds nothing with “individual.” 
 40 SCANLON, supra note 11, at 206. 
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the view that it doesn’t matter whether gays or the poor or blacks or 
women show up in legislative chambers, because straight rich white 
guys can grasp and represent their interests. 
What, then, about the worry that on many issues maybe multiple 
principles can’t be reasonably rejected, so that different and contradic-
tory principles can each be exhibited as right? or that all principles can 
be reasonably rejected, so that nothing is right?  On our everyday un-
derstanding of reasonableness, in any setting plenty of views and actions 
are reasonable.  Tort law adopts that everyday understanding.  Some 
courses of conduct don’t offer reasonable care for others: think of the 
homeowner who never shovels his sidewalk after a snowstorm, or worse 
maliciously lubricates the sidewalk to make it more slippery.  But plenty 
of lines of conduct are entirely reasonable.  You could shovel within 
twenty-four hours of snowfall’s end.  You could hire a neighborhood 
teenager or a company with a little truck equipped with a big rotary 
brush to do it.  You could painstakingly shovel the entire width of the 
sidewalk or just enough for people to walk safely in single file.  You 
could sprinkle salt or sand or gravel on the ice.  And so on.  Surely all 
of those are reasonable.  Imagine how bizarre it would be for someone 
to say, “It is unreasonable to hire a company; the only reasonable policy 
is to do it yourself.”  That’s bizarre not just because some homeowners 
are too feeble or disabled to do it, but also because there’s nothing ob-
viously wrong with contracting out here.  You might think it better to 
do your own shoveling: it’s good for your health, and you fret about 
commodifying one everyday responsibility after another.  And you might 
be entirely correct about that.  But that’s not enough to show that pa-
trons of other approaches to snow removal are unreasonable.  Any ap-
proach that clears some threshold is reasonable. 
So how does Scanlon’s theory work?  Take the basic issues of politi-
cal economy, central to current debates about equality and prominent 
on Scanlon’s radar screen.  (I suppose each is properly understood as a 
cluster of principles, but no matter.)  Let’s make a list of different pos-
sible schemes: 
 Boswell’s melodious subordination; 
 Current American market and taxation schemes; 
 Current German practices, with high-level collective deci-
sionmaking by labor, business, and government officials; 
 Libertarianism à la Nozick;41 
 A decent minimum and robust equality of opportunity, with no 
regard to the shape of the income distribution or wealth accumu-
lation; and 
 Social democracy and sharply redistributive taxation, in what-
ever version our Scandinavian anthropologist would endorse. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Yes, that would be Robert Nozick.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
(1974). 
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Did I leave out your favorite contender?  Sorry, you can add it, but it 
won’t make a difference to the point I want to press.  On the everyday 
understanding of reasonableness, one might think that one can indeed 
reasonably reject any and all of these — or that no one can reasonably 
reject any of them. 
Scanlon doubts there are good arguments for natural rights of prop-
erty that entail libertarian policies.  He casts market wages as “predis-
tribution” and taxation as “redistribution” and, following Murphy and 
Nagel,42 he urges that there is no way to redeem the intuition that tax-
ation is some illegitimate interference with the property rights we really 
do just plain have (pp. 102–09).  I agree.  So I think libertarianism is 
misconceived.  But I’m not inclined to say that libertarians therefore 
can’t reasonably reject other schemes.  They have a well-considered 
view, in the sense that they’ve thought about it, and more important 
they can adduce real and weighty reasons to support it.  So it isn’t a 
daffy or indefensible view.  If it turns out not to be the best view in 
town, still it is reasonable for them to hold it.  And — put a flag on the 
field for the umpires to review this play, as I promise they will, I will, 
shortly — it seems to follow immediately that it’s reasonable of them to 
reject competing views.  And then patrons of any candidate on my list 
can reasonably reject all the others.  In no time at all, no candidates for 
the right principles of political economy are standing.  If you plug this 
outcome back into Scanlon’s contractualist formula, you end up with the 
baffling inference that everything is wrong, because everything can be 
reasonably rejected.  Call this the permissive approach to rejectability. 
Or you might run the argument in the other direction.  You might 
say that no one can reasonably reject any of the other contenders.  After 
all, everyone should understand that all the contenders plausibly pur-
port to offer reasonable terms of social cooperation.  If any one of them 
has flaws, so do they all: if libertarianism is objectionable for the pros- 
pect of leaving poor and unemployed people shuddering in the cold, 
current American schemes are objectionable for offering unjustifiable 
rewards to the well-off, and Scandinavian social democracy is lamenta-
bly inefficient, and . . . .  That a scheme has flaws, that some reasons 
count against it, can’t be enough to reasonably reject it.  We have to 
consider all the reasons, pro and con, and come to an overall assessment.  
But that’s enormously difficult, and different people will reasonably 
weigh the pros and cons differently — and, remember, enlist facts and 
counterfactuals differently — and come to different conclusions.  Epi- 
stemic modesty or caution here threatens to teeter into paralysis of judg-
ment on the theory’s core question of what can be reasonably rejected.  
“I think the best all-things-considered judgment is that the reasons 
weigh against libertarianism, just because one or more contenders defeat 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUS-
TICE (2002). 
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it.  Given the generic reasons that people like me can adduce, it imposes 
unacceptable risks and burdens on me.”  But you can think that and 
still think it would be unreasonable of you to reject libertarianism, be-
cause you’re well aware that a parallel line of reasoning, even if you 
think it’s finally mistaken, would enable libertarians to reject your fa-
vored view.  And you know that can’t be right.  In no time at all, a 
distressingly wide range of candidates are left standing.  Plug this pic-
ture back into the contractualist formula and now you get an equally 
baffling inference: every one of these sharply conflicting views is right.  
Call this the restrictive approach to rejectability. 
Time to call in the umpire.  Think of these two approaches as differ-
ent responses to the intriguing question of whether there is space be-
tween (1) what is reasonable for you to believe and (2) what is reasonable 
for you to reject: that is, whether it follows that once it’s reasonable for 
you to believe something, it’s reasonable for you to reject other views.  
Or, to take a closely connected formulation, the question is whether 
there is something important at stake between thinking about principles 
that it’s reasonable to accept and thinking about principles that it’s rea-
sonable to reject.43  If the suitable-motivation provision is doing work 
not already being done by reasonableness, this is where it has to pick up 
some slack: reasonable rejectability is from your (generic-reason) point 
of view, and suitable motivation is sensitivity to what others have ge-
neric reason to reject.  Still I can’t see how there’s room for any space 
that will provide a way out of the dilemma I’m probing here.  You are 
considering your own generic reasons, not surely your own idiosyncratic 
reasons or threat-advantage possibilities, and you’re considering others’ 
generic reasons, too.  Others are doing the same.  Your own generic 
reasons may give you reasons to reject; maybe you don’t yourself reject 
a principle because others have generic reasons that would lead them to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Scanlon usually focuses on rejectability, for reasons he makes perhaps clearest in T. M. 
SCANLON, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 124 (2003) 
[hereinafter Utilitarianism]: 
“Consider a principle under which some people will suffer severe hardships, and suppose 
that these hardships are avoidable.  That is, there are alternative principles under which 
no one would have to bear comparable burdens.  It might happen, however, that the peo-
ple on whom these hardships fall are particularly self-sacrificing, and are willing to accept 
these burdens for the sake of what they see as the greater good of all.  We would not say, 
I think, that it would be unreasonable of them to do this.  On the other hand, it might not 
be unreasonable for them to refuse these burdens, and, hence, not unreasonable for some-
one to reject a principle requiring him to bear them.  If this rejection would be reasonable, 
then the principle imposing these burdens is put in doubt, despite the fact that some par-
ticularly self-sacrificing people could (reasonably) accept it.  Thus it is the reasonableness 
of rejecting a principle, rather than the reasonableness of accepting it, on which moral 
argument turns.” 
Id. at 133.  But see, e.g., Scanlon, Justification, supra note 32, at 2 (“Contractualism . . . makes the 
justifiability of principles depend on the reasons of certain kinds that individuals have to accept or 
reject them.”). 
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reject it.  But once you see they do, you know you can’t properly ad-
vance that principle, anyway.  So it all comes out in the wash.  That 
ends the annoying suspension of play while the umpires confer.  We 
return to our regularly scheduled programming.  Except that the whole 
damned program is nothing but relentless umpiring. 
Anyway I think the permissive approach — everything can be rea-
sonably rejected, so everything is wrong and nothing is right — is a 
more sensible way to take the dictates of the everyday understanding of 
reasonableness.  Regardless, we have a problem.  The theory was sup-
posed to illuminate how to make sense of what’s right and what’s 
wrong.  Scanlon has long conceded that particular normative judgments 
might not have any truth value.44  But that’s very different from thinking 
that on one central issue of moral and political theory after another, the 
theory breaks down. 
I know of one place where Scanlon has squarely addressed this prob-
lem.  He writes: “It seems likely that many nonequivalent sets of prin-
ciples will pass the test of nonrejectability.  This is suggested, for exam-
ple, by the fact that there are many different ways of defining important 
duties, no one of which is more or less ‘rejectable’ than the others.”45  
(Here Scanlon takes the restrictive approach: plenty of alternatives can’t 
reasonably be rejected.)  He goes on to propose that if actual social con-
ventions embody one of the acceptable principles, that should be the 
winner; and he acknowledges that this move introduces an element of 
relativism to the theory.  An easy rejoinder is that the problem remains 
daunting in cases where our actual conventions are indefensible; and 
Scanlon surely believes that when it comes to equality, in one domain 
after another, they are.  But take the cases where convention does pick 
out one scheme that can’t be reasonably rejected from a larger set of 
such schemes.  It’s not at all clear why critics of the current convention, 
with reasonable alternatives of their own, should be told, “Sorry, we’re 
prisoners of the status quo.”  The salient worry might not be relativism, 
as familiar a bugbear as that is in moral philosophy.  The salient worry 
might be a kind of conservatism.  We want normative theories to have 
critical bite.  Imagine this prefatory gloss on contractualism: “If and only 
if the status quo is simply unreasonable, we are free to canvass alterna-
tives in the following way . . . .”  Not for nothing did Marx complain 
that “[t]he tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare 
on the brain of the living.”46  You domesticate the complaint if you say 
it applies only to traditions that can reasonably be rejected. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 See, e.g., SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC, supra note 32, at 2. 
 45 SCANLON, Utilitarianism, supra note 43, at 133. 
 46 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, 
supra note 23, at 594, 595. 
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Another line of argument is available, and I think Scanlon sometimes 
adopts this line, too.  Maybe the problem flows from the everyday un-
derstanding of reasonableness, on which again plenty of alternatives can 
be reasonable — and on which you can be mistaken, though not gro-
tesquely or transparently, but still reasonable.  Maybe we should take 
reasonable as meaning what all the relevant reasons taken together and 
weighed appropriately finally counsel.  That’s obviously a departure 
from ordinary usage.  If the advocate of shoveling your own snow turns 
out to be right — if it is all things considered best to save money, not 
commodify, and pursue your health — then we have to swallow hard 
and agree that all the other approaches are unreasonable.  Clearing a 
threshold isn’t enough. 
Of course different people are differently situated.  So you can hang 
onto the thought that just one course of action is reasonable, but insist 
on taking separate cases as they come.  If you’re a gym rat, you don’t 
need the exercise as much, and maybe you have plenty of money and 
lots of childcare responsibilities: so for you it might be best, all things 
considered, to hire someone.  But if my exercise consists in waddling my 
stertorous way to the kitchen, ripping open jumbo bags of Doritos, open-
ing bottles of beer, and plodding back to the couch, and my budget is 
tight, and I live alone, well then for me it’s best, all things considered, 
to shovel by myself.  (But what about the risk of a heart attack?)  Fair 
enough, but the point remains.  One and only one course of action is in 
this sense reasonable.  Sure, one can imagine an occasional tie.  But 
that’s nothing like worrying that we regularly face whole families of 
views that cross a threshold of reasonability. 
Sometimes Scanlon seems to adopt this alternate understanding of 
reasonableness.  He writes: “A claim about what it is reasonable for a 
person to do presupposes a certain body of information and a certain 
range of reasons which are taken to be relevant, and goes on to make a 
claim about what these reasons, properly understood, in fact support.”47  
On the issue at hand, the sentence is perhaps ambiguous, but it is sensi-
ble to read it as saying that only the best all-things-considered position 
is reasonable.  More striking, Scanlon writes: 
If the objections to permission are strong enough, compared to the objections 
to prohibition, to make it reasonable to reject any principle permitting doing 
X in C, then one would not expect the objections to prohibition to be strong 
enough, compared to the objections to permission, to make it reasonable to 
reject any principle that forbids doing X in C.48 
He goes on to discuss the case of two people, gone overboard from a 
sinking ship, who find one life jacket.  On the everyday understanding 
of reasonableness, one would surmise that plenty of options — first 
come, first served; whoever’s strong enough to wrestle it away gets it; 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 SCANLON, supra note 11, at 192. 
 48 Id. at 195. 
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whoever’s younger; whoever’s life is of more social value; and plenty 
more you can fill in during your sadistic leisure time — are reasonable; 
so again either none of them can reasonably be rejected or they all can.  
Or you might think that the desperate scarcity here puts us outside what 
we now think of as Hume’s circumstances of justice and makes the quest 
for a moral solution quixotic or worse.  But Scanlon holds: 
A principle permitting each to struggle for the jacket at least has the merit 
of recognizing the symmetry of their claims and the need for some decisive 
solution.  It would be reasonable to reject this principle if, but only if, there 
were some alternative that did this better (such as a principle requiring them 
to take turns or, unrealistic as it may seem, to draw lots).  Similarly, a prin-
ciple forbidding the use of force could not reasonably be rejected if there 
were some other (nonrejectable) method for resolving the matter.49 
The best reading of these passages, I think, is that Scanlon is deploying 
not the everyday understanding of reasonableness, on which multiple 
options might be perfectly reasonable, but the alternate understanding 
of reasonableness, on which only the best option is. 
The alternate picture gets rid of the worry that either all positions 
can be reasonably rejected or many can’t be.  In principle, it gives us 
the kind of determinacy we’re looking for, at least as a general matter.  
But it comes with two whopping price tags attached.  Not the departure 
from ordinary usage: ordinary usage has no special claim in theory-
building.  The first price is that it threatens to corrode our epistemic 
confidence in controversial normative claims.  It’s one thing for a liber-
tarian or a Scandinavian social democrat to think, “At the very least I 
have a serious contender.”  That’s easy enough.  It’s another to think, 
“Actually I have the right view.”  It won’t do to say that there is no 
logical space between “I believe p” and “p is true” or “p is right,” that all 
of them simply assert p.  There is nothing incoherent or dicey about 
thinking, “I’ve thought hard about political economy, and I think social 
democracy is the best view, but I could well be wrong about that.”  This 
threatens to land us back in the vexing problem we faced with ordinary 
reasonableness: you just don’t know if you can reasonably reject an-
other’s view, because it is exceedingly hard to say with a straight face 
that you’re confident that your view really is the best one. 
The second price is that it leaves Scanlon’s contractualism teetering 
dangerously close to a truism.  Remember the core proposition: a prin-
ciple is right if no one can reasonably reject it.  With the alternate un-
derstanding, that now becomes, a principle is right if all the relevant 
reasons, weighed correctly, finally counsel it.  That’s not quite a truism: 
it tells us that the currency of normative argument is reasons, and that 
we have to take all the relevant ones and consider them.  (“Wait: not 
just reasons, but reasons to reject”?  On the alternate understanding I’m 
pursuing here, it seems to follow trivially that it’s reasonable to reject 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 Id. at 196. 
   
2018] FACTS, VALUES, JUSTIFICATION, DEMOCRACY 2383 
any view which is not in fact finally best supported by all the relevant 
reasons.)  So it rules out, say, the view that a principle is right if it ac-
cords with your inarticulate intuitions.  Even if intuitions are at some 
level an inescapable part of the story, in one argument after another we 
can do better than assert them and then stick out our tongues at each 
other.  I quite agree.  But — your mileage may vary, as the kiddies say — 
I confess I don’t see a whole lot of theoretical oomph in that. 
So here’s my diagnosis.  (The reviewer as quick-change artist: umpire’s 
uniform off, doctor’s coat on.)  I suspect the “no one can reasonably reject” 
formula trades for its intuitive appeal on the everyday picture of reason-
ableness.  It would be nice to imagine that on any issue there’s just one 
normative principle that it is goofy or indefensible or obviously out of 
line to reject.  But the everyday understanding makes that unattainable, 
at least on a distressingly wide range of issues.  The move to the alter-
nate picture of reasonableness, on which only the single best view counts 
as reasonable, solves that problem.  But it surrenders the intuitive ap-
peal of the contractual formula.  The dilemma here is a frontal challenge 
to Scanlon’s contractualism.  You can get normative plausibility or you 
can get normative closure.  You can’t get both — in this approach.  I 
don’t see a satisfactory way to deal with this dilemma.  And if I’m right 
in thinking Scanlon’s contractualism founders, it can’t supply any jus-
tificatory basis for his account of equality.  Either it’s too easy to say it 
can’t be reasonably rejected, because neither can tons of rival views, or 
it’s too easy to say it can be reasonably rejected, because so can every-
thing else in the terrain.  Here Goldilocks either likes one bowl of por-
ridge after another or she disdainfully turns up her nose at all of them; 
either she’s a shameless gourmand or an impossibly demanding gour-
met; nothing turns out just right.  
* * * 
Where are we?  Scanlon’s contractualism raises some puzzles and 
worries.  They threaten his account of equality: we don’t know that it 
can’t reasonably be rejected, and we don’t know how to begin evaluat-
ing it if we jettison the contractualist machinery.  But I don’t think these 
puzzles and worries have a philosophical solution.  They have a practi-
cal solution.  Its name is democracy. 
In democratic politics — I don’t mean just voting or elections or 
legislative affairs — we don’t have to conjure up imagined others with 
imagined standpoints and try to figure out what they might say about 
our proposals.  We can talk to actual others with real standpoints, people 
with different sorts of life experiences and different areas of knowledge, 
and listen to what they have to say.  They can enrich or correct our 
stylized grasp of generic reasons; they can bring into sharper focus what 
the pros and cons of some principle are.  If we think more than one 
policy option is reasonable, we can try collectively to figure out which 
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one seems best.  We can think group deliberation is epistemically more 
reliable than any one person’s arguments, however carefully considered 
and ingenious.  That remains true if we think we are looking for the 
actual single best view.  We have real equals in the real world, chock 
full of views of their own.  They may know a whole lot more about the 
problems and possibilities of being an undocumented immigrant or a 
middle-aged laid-off salesman or a patient with a chronic illness strug-
gling to make ends meet than we do.  The collision between our argu-
ments and theirs should improve our proposals.  That is the promise of 
democratic debate or “government by discussion.”50  The debate can 
unfold among citizens, among their elected representatives, and between 
those two groups too.  And we can have epistemic divisions of labor — 
think for instance of the roles of congressional subcommittees, adminis-
trative agencies, economists, scientists, and other experts — as long as 
they are accountable to the broader democratic public.  As the discus-
sion goes on, we provisionally adopt policies that currently seem justi-
fied.  We can constantly revise our positions and our practices as we learn 
from experience and argument.  Democracy after all is (in)famous for its 
irreverence to the past.  Here’s John Stuart Mill, urging in Parliament that 
women be given the vote:  
[T]he despotism of custom is on the wane; we are not now satisfied with 
knowing what a thing is, we ask whether it ought to be; and in this House 
at least, I am bound to believe that an appeal lies from custom to a higher 
tribunal, in which reason is judge.51 
Now that is surely a ludicrous description of today’s politics in these 
United States.  The wealthy do in fact have an outsized voice, even 
control.  (Moaning and groaning about corporations, especially after  
Citizens United,52 is misguided.  I’m a lot more worried about Sheldon 
Adelson than I am about Greenpeace, and that’s not a covert way of 
advancing the left: I’m also a lot more worried about George Soros than 
I am about Massachusetts Citizens for Life.)  Sometimes we practice 
brute-fact preference aggregation and mechanical interest-group plural-
ism, two obviously repellent views of democracy championed (in the 
name of realism! sigh) by roughly 13,284 economists and political scien-
tists.  More and more of us live in epistemic bubbles, where we read and 
watch and listen only to like-minded sources and adopt threadbare car-
icatures of our opponents.  Slogans and sneers with the most tenuous 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 The phrase is initially from WALTER BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND POLITICS 115 (Beacon Press 
1956) (1872), but it captures a central insight of liberal democratic theory. 
 51 28 JOHN STUART MILL, The Admission of Women to the Electoral Franchise (May 20, 1867), 
in PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES, 151, 153 (John M. Robson & Bruce L. Kinzer eds., 
1988). 
 52 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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connection to the actual landscape command the day.  The quintessen-
tial ideas of reasonable (in the everyday sense!) disagreement and loyal 
opposition seem to be the stuff of maudlin nostalgia. 
But principled arguments on the merits still comprise a real strand 
of our democratic politics, and we can always reform the practice to 
improve it.53  (That doesn’t mean eliminating interest-group pluralism 
or even preference aggregation.  I don’t think democratic politics should 
be modeled on a boring graduate seminar, where everyone is trying to 
figure out the best argument but no one cares or has any particular 
stakes.  But that’s another matter.)  So yes, ours is a democratic system 
in considerable disrepair.  But only a blind philistine could shrug off 
what we are doing as of no theoretical interest.  And we can helpfully 
fan out to a broader set of collective and discursive practices.  We can 
mine the common law of tort and consider what claims a wide range of 
actors have pressed over many issues and many decades, and try to 
make critical sense of what the law has done in response.  We can think 
about the unfolding constitutional constraints on majoritarianism and 
what they tell us about principles of right. 
An unvarnished pragmatist, I think we’re always working to im-
prove our web of beliefs and practices, or anyway we always could and 
should be.  (Okay, fine, we get time off to daydream and the like.)  So 
we can change the ground rules for democratic politics, and we can re-
vise our understanding of reasonableness, and so on across the board.  
Scanlon’s version of equality might turn out to be a big winner, but like 
absolutely everything else it is corrigible.  Still the best way to test its 
merits is not to explore it in review essays or philosophy graduate semi-
nars.  It’s to articulate and pursue it in the world, in democratic politics, 
and see what happens.  Not just the brute fact of whether or to what 
extent it wins or loses, but what we make on reflection of how things 
unfold.  Will some of that reflection appear in law review pages or uni-
versity press books?  Sure.  But that’s not where the action is. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927), still best read as in part a response 
to WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922) and WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM 
PUBLIC (1927); and, more narrowly but more lucidly, 14 JOHN DEWEY, Creative Democracy — 
The Task Before Us (1939), reprinted in THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 224 (Jo Ann Boydston 
ed., 1988). 
